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PA N E L

Friends of the Court?
The Bar, the Media, and the Public
Steve Leben, John Russonello, and Malcolm Feeley

The fourth panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence explores the way the public thinks about judicial
independence and ways in which the media and members of the
bar may affect judicial independence. The discussion was led by
then-AJA secretary Steve Leben, a state general-jurisdiction trial
judge from Kansas. Panelists were John Russonello, a pollster and
consultant to nonprofit organizations, political campaigns, and
other clients, and Malcolm Feeley, professor at the Boalt Hall
School of Law at the University of California-Berkeley. The
National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a generous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE STEVE LEBEN: John Russonello and Malcolm Feeley are
going to talk about the ways in which the public can be mobilized to assist us in preserving judicial independence and the
ways in which the public may have different views than we do.
They will also talk about ways in which the organized bar may
be either a help or a hindrance to the goal of judicial independence. . . .
In the [Summer 2004] Court Review, there’s a short article
by John Russonello with some of his thoughts about public
opinion and the courts. . . .1 We want to start off with John
Russonello telling you some of his thoughts from the various
polling he’s done and the focus groups he’s done over the years
about the way in which the public thinks about judicial independence.

This panel I noticed in the program
is entitled “Friends of the Court? The Bar, the Media and
Public.” Well, I don’t know much about the bar because my
practice is in public opinion, but I know something about the
public and the press, and one might say that they’re fairweather friends. You might say that their attitudes are situational rather than faith-based in the coming message.
So if they are situational as opposed to faith-based, the question is how do we meet the public and the press and cross that
river of skepticism and doubt onto the other side of trusting
the courts and having faith in the courts?
Well, one thing that we should establish right off the bat,
and that is no matter what we do, there’s nothing we can do to
avoid rulings that will create hurt feelings and heated debate.
It’s just the nature of the courts and what you all have to deal
with every day, but there are steps that the courts can take,
court advocates can take, to minimize the impact that controversies have on long-term attitudes toward the courts.
MR. JOHN RUSSONELLO:

Footnotes
1. John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to Promote the Courts and
Blunt Attacks on the Judiciary, COURT REVIEW, Summer 2004, at 10.

36 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005

Where are most Americans on the courts? Most of the public doesn’t follow the day-to-day workings of the courts, but
they hold a basic understanding of how the system should
work. For instance, most cannot recite the Constitution, but
they know that the Constitution protects their rights and they
know that the courts protect the Constitution. They know
what their rights are. They can’t tell you who Miranda was, but
they can tell you what the police officer has to say to you if you
get arrested.
A lot of this comes from popular culture. Americans have
been taking weekly courses in kind of court procedure, you
might say, civics lessons in the judicial system, by watching
television from shows as far back as the FBI with Efrem
Zimbalist, Jr., to Hill Street Blues to Law and Order. When I do
focus groups with people about the courts, those are the things
they recite.
They also recite things like the woman who burned herself
on McDonald’s coffee as the reason why lawsuits are out of
control, but that’s a whole ’nother topic.
The public generally has favorable attitudes for the courts
despite all the criticisms. When you ask them favorable or
unfavorable, it’s consistently favorable, so it’s positive. They
have positive expectations, but they have a lot of ignorance
and distress as well.
For instance, a survey of ours in Pennsylvania recently
showed that in a state that elects its judges, 69% of the public
either believes that the state judges are appointed or don’t
know, and nationally, where federal judges are appointed, 55%
of the public believes judges are elected or don’t know.
Attitudes are grounded in four values. By values I mean the
core beliefs that are rock bottom and determine our attitudes
and our behavior and everything that we do. There are a limited number of values that really motivate people and on
courts there are four: Fairness, we’ve heard a lot of about that
today; independence, obviously; accountability; and adherence
to community norms.
Those are the four values that come up over and over again
as the foundation of how people form their attitudes about the
courts, and as you know, these altitudes conflict from time to
time. People say judicial independence is important and they
need it. Sixty-eight percent say that federal judges should only
consider the Constitution and the facts of a case without any—
the word “any” was put in the question—any attention to public opinion. That’s 68%, but we know that when a controversial case comes up, the dedication to principle which I just out-

lined, that principle of independence, sometimes bends to the
application of independence, and you’ve got many instances,
I’m sure, to attest to that.
These values conflict often. People want accountability.
They want independence, but they also want accountability.
How do they resolve that? Well, it’s hard. Seven in ten oppose
lifetime appointments. They tell us they oppose lifetime
appointments because they think there’s not enough remedies
for correcting bad decisions by judges. The majority say that.
The majority also says that lifetime appointments will result in
judges who are out of touch with the world of people. Sixtyone percent nationally say that judges’ decisions are more
likely to reflect their personal political views than independent
judgment.
Critics of the judiciary play on these attitudes, play on these
public sentiments of judges not being fair and not being
responsive to national norms. These turned into criticisms, socalled liberal judges or activist judges. Our research suggests
that these labels stick and can do damage if they’re not countered with another point of view.
That other point of view—to bolster public appreciation for
the judicial system—should have four basic elements. First,
the public must hear a constant drumming of messages from
court advocates about how the courts defend the rights of all
Americans. It’s not about judges. It’s about the rights of people, which is why people think the courts are valuable.
I’d ask you to pretend that the courts are a candidate—not
judges—but pretend the courts as an institution are a candidate and you’re all political consultants now and you’ve got to
figure out how to present that candidate in a way that has
meaning and value to people. Why is your candidate more
qualified than his or her opponent?
With the courts it would be stories of individuals. This is
what you would put on the air for your candidate: individuals
who have been wronged by big institutions—government,
industry, business—who use the courts as the last resort for
justice. Stories of an elderly woman getting her right to stay in
her apartment; the veteran using the court to obtain health
care that was denied by government bureaucrats; communities
like Woburn, Massachusetts, or Anniston, Alabama, who held
corporations accountable for the poisons dumped on their
ground, to actions that prevent the same things from happening to other communities. These are the type of affirmative
cases and stories that make the case to fairly defend the courts.
The second element of the four is to make your stories contemporary. We do a lot of work for the civil-rights community,
and they’re always wanting to harken back to Brown v. Board of
Education and other important milestones in the civil-rights
struggle and other areas. Americans remember historical allusions, but we’re a society that believes that things are constantly changing and that yesterday’s solutions should not be
expected to fit today’s problems. Using historical references
doesn’t usually connect with the public.
Third, and this is a tough one to say to this crowd, always
remember that your cause is not to defend judges, but to
strengthen the faith in the courts. The public’s point of
salience is that the courts defend individual rights. That’s why
you’re important. Protecting the institution that’s the defender
of rights is more important than focusing on individual judges.

And, fourth, we found in our polling that building long-term
public support for a strong judiciary will require a better
informed public. In our research we’ve done a lot of questions
of people over the years and running through different statistical analyses, and we found that the correlation between
strongly supporting the courts in the face of attacks and knowledge of the courts is very high. Having an understanding of the
role of precedents, appeals, constitutional review, and other
aspects of the courts reinforces an appreciation for the courts
and their role as guardian and protector of individual rights.
These things can be woven into programs by state judges
associations, state bar associations, civil-rights organizations,
and other organizations. If we tell the stories of courts as
champions of fairness, they can only be fair if they’re independent. This will not prevent individuals or interest groups from
protesting specific decisions or vilifying specific judges. What
I said at the outset will always be true. You’ll always get criticized. You’ll always get hit. These four elements aren’t going
to protect you from that, but they will provide a more informed
public that will see more clearly how the system benefits them
that will withstand the courses in the future. . . .
JUDGE LEBEN: . . . John Russonello has given you a view on
how to improve public respect for an independent judiciary as
seen from someone who has been a political consultant and
who works now in polling and focus-group research and works
as a consultant to a variety of organizations.
For a different perspective on the same idea, what’s necessary for [a] public support system of judicial independence,
Professor Feeley will discuss things that are related to what’s
important in a society and what’s important in a governmental
system. . . .
PROFESSOR MALCOLM FEELEY: . . . I want to explore with you
or share with you a problem that I’ve been puzzling over for the
past several years and then my tentative solution to the problem
that is posed. For the past 20 years, 25, 30 years, I’ve been writing books about folks like you. I’ve been teaching at the
National Judicial College in the master [of] judicial studies program up at Reno. . . . I know what you think. I know how you’re
selected. I’ve watched you in benches across the country.
Now, for the past 20 years I’ve been going to Japan on and
off a number of times. I’ve spent time sitting on the bench. I
haven’t understood much, but I haven’t understood much
when I’ve been sitting in your courtrooms as well.
I’ve talked to prosecutors, defense attorneys giving talks to
the bar in Japan, and learned something about the Japanese
judiciary as well as here.
Here’s the problem: Japanese judges are selected by vigorous competition. Only 3 percent of the people that take the
state-sponsored bar exam pass it. Out of that tiny group, only
the best and the brightest are selected for the two-year internship in the judicial school run by the Supreme Court of Japan.
Some of those are weeded out. So it’s a highly selective, professional, merit-based judiciary, the best and the brightest
across. It’s well paid—better than you all, by and large—and
high prestige—better than you, by and large. It is the ideal
judiciary: well paid, high prestige, merit selection or professional career advancement, and the like.
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You all know what your prior backgrounds were, you all
know how much training you got between the day you were
selected to be a judge and you put on that black robe, so it’s a
world of difference.
Well, here’s my problem. Why is it? Why is it do I think
that American state, not federal, but state trial court judges are
more independent than Japanese judges given everything I’ve
said about it? I do think that, and then I set about trying to
convince myself or explain. I came to the conclusion first and
then I wanted to work backwards and figure out why that was
the case, and I want to share with you some of my tentative
thoughts. . . .
I think we can understand a lot about us if we know something about them. We can see us clearly in contrast to them,
so I think the comparative enterprise is useful, but let me identify some things. I’m going to dramatically simplify, but bear
with me.
Let me suggest that there are two types of law. I mean
there’s a variety, but let me identify two polar opposites. One

omy to move and adjust and, in the terms of the previous
panel, solve problems. One is bounded by the rules, as it were.
Secondly, it fosters a type of civil-service-like mentality that is
not especially creative and it emphasizes procedure over substance. In short, it’s not a very creative and not a very exciting
enterprise, although we all value bureaucracy and see the values of those sorts of things in a lot of ways.
Let me contrast that with another view of law and I think
you’ll begin to recognize this. I call it, because I steal from a
colleague, I call that responsive law. Let me identify some of
the distinguishing features.
First, the sources of law. [I]n bureaucratic law, the source
of law is the state: If the legislature passes it, my job is to
enforce it, to apply the rules.
In responsive law, the source of law can be vague. It can be
the state, obviously, but it can be general principles. It can be
natural law. It can be aspirations, constitutional aspirations. It
can be one’s fidelity to a sense of justice that is more than the
sum total of all the rules. It’s a vague or an ambitious enter-

There are a limited number of values that
really motivate people and on courts there
are four: Fairness . . ., independence . . .,
accountability, and adherence to community
norms.
– John Russonello

I’ll call bureaucratic law. The term “bureaucratic” gives part
of what I want to convey. Its distinctive features are the
source of the law is the state and the cast of the judge is to
apply the rules. There’s limited discretion, there’s . . . a high
degree of effort to maintain consistency, procedural regularity
is important, and judges can even be selected and trained to
be able to follow in this tradition. They can be like professionalized civil servants, as it were. Independence can be
maintained as bureaucrats everywhere maintain independence, keeping their eyes averted and their nose to the paper
in front of them and narrowing their horizons, crossing the T’s
and dotting the I’s and hoping that controversy will sail over
their head. So that’s one view of law. It’s a very common view
of law. It’s a view of law that begins to look a little bit like law
in Japan.
Now the challenges to this, of course, are the converse. If
there’s limited discretion and procedure is paramount, that
means there’s not a lot of discretion, there’s not a lot of auton38 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005

prise, but it suggests that law is something more than the
subtotal of those rules passed by the state. It’s anchored out
there somewhere. You’ll remember this from civics lessons in
undergraduate days if nothing else.
This view of law also embraces the discretion of judges. It
suggests that the judges should be responsive not only to the
rules, but to the sense of justice that is behind those rules that
gives them a fair degree of flexibility and some discretion, at
least invites that. It invites a concern with the effectiveness of
outcome. In the previous panel, we heard problem solving.
Responsive law generally and I think the common-law tradition, certainly the American common-law tradition, invites
problem solving and concerns with outcome and substance
and effectiveness in a variety of ways. The function of the law
is not to apply the rules narrowly, but to fulfill aspirations.
Now these two are not mutually exclusive, and I don’t mean to
suggest they are.
It also suggests that judges, courts—and I like John’s

emphasis on courts rather than judges, the individual judges—
the institution of the judiciary more generally, I’m saying the
institution of law, is designed to reflect in some way and capture and express and give substance and meaning to social values, so law is consistently changing in a variety of ways.
Now the problem, the challenge of responsive law, strikes
me as this: If it embraces expansive aspirations and identifies
substantive concerns to address, it also invites . . . public controversy. It’s going to be linked with public controversy
because it’s dealing with substantive social issues, and as society changes, the effort to work through those is going to generate a variety of controversies. That’s going to play out in a
variety of ways, including the process of selecting judges. It
just strikes me it’s a feature of what I would call responsive law.
It’s not abnormal. It’s not weird. It’s not inconsistent with. It’s
just an aspect or a feature of what I call responsive law.
Now obviously these challenges need to be met. They need
to be moderated. We can’t have the distinction between legislator and judge disappear, and law means something more and
something different than what legislatures are, so let me identify two institutional arrangements that I think go some way to
foster judicial independence and to gain an excessive amount
of accountability, I suppose you might characterize it, in terms
of public oversight of judges.
Now these two features I suggest are sort of counterintuitive
on the face but will become, I think, obvious after reflection.
One is a competitive party system. A competitive party system,
I maintain, is a necessary condition for an independent judi-

ciary. Now we think of competitive party systems often as
leading to competitive judicial selection processes and the like,
but let me identify why I think competitive party systems are
important for independent judges, and by a competitive party
system I mean a party system in which the reins of government
shift from one party to another in the two-party system or
multiparty system—in which there is some rotation in office
by different parties, is what I mean by that.
Look everywhere and always. Those who control the reins
of government want to harness the judiciary to their purposes.
If you control the reins of government, one important engine
or one important horse pulling that is the judiciary, and it
makes sense, and everywhere all these parties want to. Parties
in control want to use the judiciary to advance their causes.
I invite you to think of any. You name a one-party state anywhere in history you can think of that’s been in power for some
time that has had an independent judiciary—that is a oneparty country, I mean, and I think you would be hard pressed
to find one.
Why is that? Well, I suggest this. In competitive-party systems everybody who is in power can anticipate at some point
they will be out of power and they will quickly agree, for all
sorts of reasons that I will skip over right now, that there are
certain institutional arrangements that make sense to be independent. The judiciary is one of those. Those who pass legislation or adopt laws when they are in power would like some
guarantee that they would be enforced when they’re out of
power, and an independent judiciary is one way to do that.
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Now, it’s a lot more trouble. I mean they can repeal the legislation, obviously, but it takes some considerable effort, more
than simple majorities, usually, to repeal legislation. So that’s
one of the reasons.
So I suggest that a two-party competitive party system, two
parties normally, creates an incentive to keep the judiciary
independent and I think that goes a long way—a long, long
way—to explaining why the American judiciary is as independent as it is, but there’s a second factor and that’s more problematic and I’m not going to dwell on it, but I’ll hit it fast.
The second factor enhancing independence is what I’ll call
an economist legal system. I want to shift now and not talk
about judicial independence, but I want to talk about something broader that incorporates independence, but I’ll call it an
autonomous legal system. I’ll go back to my idea of responsive
law and suggest that by responsive law I mean a legal system
that responds to a quest for justice not simply as applying particular rules embraced by the state.
Now the two-party system goes some ways to protecting
that, but let me suggest another necessary feature of a robust
economist system, and that is a strong and robust bar. The law
as it belongs to anybody, it belongs to us all and it belongs to
the people, yes, but there are two institutional stewards that
are necessary to protect a robust autonomous legal system.
That’s the bench and that is the bar. They work in concert to
protect the autonomy of that universe, the autonomy from
takeover by the state, as it were, on one hand and the autonomy for being overly responsive to the public on the other.
That is you two together, the bench and the bar, have this stewardship obligation.
Now the reason, the reason that I’ve concluded that the
judiciary in Japan, for all its professionalism, is not independent is that it lacks a two-party tradition—the liberal
Democratic Party has been in power since World War II—and
it lacks a robust and independent and large bar that is joined
in partnership with the bench. You’re either a lawyer or you
are a judge [or] a prosecutor, in Japan. The idea that you can
be a judge and a lawyer or lawyer/judge is not heard. You’re
either a lawyer or a judge. They don’t fraternize.
The American Bar Association has a section, a division for
judges. Judges move in and out. You guys, some of you guys
will go back, maybe even unwillingly, to practice law at some
point. There is a connection between bench and bar and it’s
that connection, I think, with a large and robust bar that goes
a considerable way to make the American judiciary as independent as it is.
Now I don’t want to suggest that I think everything is okay,
but I do want to make several sort of concluding remarks with
regard to this. One, to the extent that there are problems of a
lack of judicial independence in the United States, let me suggest that the most egregious examples of those, I think—this is
a hypothesis—are found in those regions, in those communities, in which there is not a robust competitive party system.
Think of Chicago, old Chicago. Maybe not new Chicago. You
tell me. That is one.
A second thing I want to suggest is that I think that the bar
in recent years, preoccupied as it is with getting rich and protecting its monopoly, has failed in its stewardship responsibilities to protecting the autonomy of the law. Now one important
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way to do that is to protect the autonomy of the court system
and judges.
The bar has failed to speak out enough—adequately, loudly,
vigorously, frequently enough—when crazy complaints have
been made against judges. They have failed to endorse enough
people and vigorously support the judges—the judiciary at
times—and they have failed to speak out in the face of outrageous claims. The bar, I think, has failed and one of the things
you might think about is asking yourselves institutionally how
you can revive a more vigorous and robust connection between
bench and bar.
The final thought I want to pass is that to some extent controversy, vast amounts of controversy, are just inherent in what
I have termed a robust autonomous responsive legal system
because a robust responsive autonomous legal system is one in
which the judiciary takes new issues, tries to formulate new
policies, new rules facing those, and is likely to get caught in
the controversy about those issues generally. . . .
I want to start with a question to both of you.
Professor Feeley has noted with respect to the bar that in some
respects they may have failed in their obligation to really be a
defender of the judiciary in recent years, and one reason for
that may be the increasing segmentization of the bar, that you
have a plaintiffs’ bar with one set of interests, a defense bar
with another set of interests, and other splinter bar groups that
are working.
So my question to Professor Feeley would be, from your
prospective how do we get around that, and to John
Russonello it would be, as a consultant who works with groups
like that that want to have a particular message, how do we get
them to focus a little bit differently?
JUDGE LEBEN:

It’s a hard problem. Tony Kronman, the
former dean of the Yale Law School, has written a book called
The Lost Lawyer, and he laments the decline of the publicregardingness of lawyers and the bar. In the law schools we are
trying to revive that spirit that says as a lawyer you wear two
hats. You are a provider for your family and an advocate for
your client, and the other one is that you are a steward for the
legal system, and you guys might in your various talks at various local bar functions remind the lawyers that there can be
heated differences, but at some level they ought to come
together to protect the institution of the judiciary. . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY:

Lawyers can help the judiciary if they have
more credibility themselves, and let me say two things about
that. The first is we’ve done a lot of work for lawyers and for
legal services and what we found is when people criticize
lawyers, you hear it in the campaign: “Lawyers are responsible for frivolous lawsuits that are clogging the courts.” People
agree with that, but it doesn’t affect their opinions on things
like support for legal services, support for the courts, because
they see through it. They can agree with that but still take the
right position, the aggressive position about supporting the
courts and supporting programs for the people. That’s number
one. That’s what you have going for you.
Number two, the number-one thing you find that you can
do to improve the opinion of lawyers is to do pro bono work
MR. RUSSONELLO:

and let the public know about it because the charge that sticks
is not so much that you’re clogging the courts with frivolous
lawsuits. It’s that you charge too much and that you make too
much money, and there’s no way to tell people no, we don’t
make too much money because when you tell them what you
make, they get even more enraged.
The way you counteract the money thing for the bar is to
get them to do more pro bono work that shows that they care,
so (a) the bar should not pay attention to the noise about frivolous lawsuits because it’s just noise, and (b) they can help
themselves and the courts by doing more pro bono work and
letting the public know about it.
John Russonello, let me ask you this question.
Professor Feeley has described a complicated legal system, one
in which judges have discretion, one in which the law comes
from multiple sources, one in which the judge is clearly exercising discretion and making choices that may be policy
related. On the other hand, the public would prefer or might
JUDGE LEBEN:

sideration the circumstances in which a crime was committed.
That made them understand and it went from 65% for the public supporting mandatory minimums to 68, 69% opposing
mandatory minimums.
Professor Feeley, any comment on presenting a
nuanced view of the system to the public?
JUDGE LEBEN:

One is, as I said, you’re just going to have
a fair amount of controversy, and certainly during an era of
“Get Tough on Crime” you’re going to have to weigh that.
What has been really disappointing certainly here in
California, the years I’ve been here, is the bar organization has
not stepped forward to run interference for the courts, has not
come forward to say, look, it’s complicated. Stand back.
Simple solutions don’t work.
It has remained silent and let the legislature run over us and
institutionalized terrible sentencing mandatory minimums, as
it were, to the Constitution, making it really difficult.
PROFESSOR FEELEY:

The bar has failed to speak out enough . . .
when crazy complaints have been made
against judges . . . . [O]ne of the things you
might think about is asking yourselves
institutionally how you can revive a more
vigorous and robust connection between
bench and bar.
– Malcolm Feeley

react more easily to a judge who has no discretion and is simply applying the law fairly and impartially. Is there a way to
defend the more nuanced legal system or is it necessary to
dumb it down in public presentations, as if there weren’t as
much policy choice in the development of common law as
there really is?
This goes to the heart of mandatory minimums because for years it was assumed that the public supported mandatory minimums because they thought it was fair to
have judges be locked in so that one person that commits a
crime gets the same penalty as another person who commits a
crime, which is why the liberals proposed mandatory minimums
in the first place. It didn’t turn out that way. What we found five
years ago was that the public is starting to turn on mandatory
minimums because they’ve started to see they’re unfair.
So you can explain nuances to people when we put it before
the public and say this doesn’t allow judges to take into con-

JUDGE LEBEN: Are there members in the audience who have
a public-relations issue in your own court, [or are] having any
difficulty with the public understanding what you’re doing,
understanding decisions or types of decisions, any area in
which you would like to get the advice of a consultant on public opinion and how to improve public opinion of your court?
....

MR. RUSSONELLO:

MR. LARRY HANSEN: I’m with the Joyce Foundation. I live
in Cook County. It never occurred to me until this moment
that we were so close to the Japanese model. We have neither
a competitive party system in Cook County and the bar association is not particularly vigorous in defending the courts,
although at times it could hardly be faulted for that, given the
behavior of our courts on occasion.
I have just have a question for John. One reason the Joyce
Foundation got involved with this issue five or six years ago
was partly the advertisements we saw coming out of Ohio and
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other jurisdictions, but I was particularly shocked by I think
it was a 1999 poll that had been done by the Texas Bar
Association and by the Supreme Court of Texas, and one of
the questions that was asked of lawyers and the general public and court personnel and judges was whether or not campaign contributions had any effect on the decisions that
judges made.
Not surprisingly, the public by a very substantial margin
said yes. Court personnel said yes, but at a lesser level. Even
lawyers, in excess of 50 percent, said that campaign contributions made a difference, but what astonished me the most was
that 49 percent of the judges who were surveyed said that this
was a problem.
John, in your polling [what] have you seen? Have you
raised this issue with the general public? I think the merits

I think that’s a long-term issue. There are
some issues that are short term that you can do. Short term is
focus on individual rights, show how you help. Those examples I gave in my talk, show how you help to better people’s
lives, and give them you’re the institution of last resort when
you’ve got a problem against an institution. That’s short term.
You can do that right away.
The accountability thing is a long-term issue that has to be
done with education in the schools about all the checks and
balances on judges. You can’t do that in the short term. That
has to be ingrained in public education because you can’t go
out and tell people you’re accountable. It’s just nothing that
you can sell, yourself. They’re just going to have to understand
over the more long-term education. . . .

MR. RUSSONELLO:

[A]lways remember that your cause is not to
defend judges, but to strengthen the faith in
the courts. The public’s point of salience is
that the courts defend individual rights.
That’s why you’re important. Protecting the
institution that’s the defender of rights is more
important than focusing on individual judges.
– John Russonello

poll for Judith Kaye’s commission raised it last year. I think in
Ohio and perhaps in Pennsylvania, it’s been raised in some
polls as well. You and I come out of political backgrounds. I
would just say that I think the public and the judges actually
may have an exaggerated view, but in politics perceptions
count a lot and people very often act on perceptions, not just
the facts.
We haven’t done polling specifically on
this, but our research suggests that what you’re saying could be
a strong campaign with the public if one wanted to cut down
on the contributions or have some tougher reporting on contributions of judges. The public is usually loath to do away
with election of judges because they see it as giving themselves
a voice that they wouldn’t have without the funding process.
MR. RUSSONELLO:

. . . The one thing that I don’t think you
should do, and I think it’s consistent with the polling he found,
and that is the more people know about how your court operates, the lower their estimation of you is.
One of the reasons they hold you in such high regard is they
don’t know the great details. There is something odd about
that. You know judges are held in very high regard in this
country, but the more you tell, the more they know about the
operations of your courts, the less they know, and that’s not
totally surprising to me.
So you have a good rep. I think you need to build institutional alliances, as John said, for the court system, for the legal
system, to embrace the enterprise and not a particular judge,
and so I would echo many of the themes that he’s spoken of.
PROFESSOR FEELEY:

Professor Schotland, did you have quick point
you wanted to bounce off this panel?
JUDGE LEBEN:

Earlier, in several of the presentations, there
was discussion about judges being accountable to the public.
How would either of you suggest either from a public-opinion
standpoint or from a systems standpoint judges could best
both hold themselves accountable and be publicly perceived
for being so?
JUDGE LEBEN:

42 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005

It is about the lightning rod called
the Ten Commandments. A rising number of people in a rising array of states are of the view that it’s wrong to insist you
not have the Ten Commandments in the courthouse. In
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND:

Alabama in the primary this year, somebody known as for the
former chief justice beat others who wouldn’t speak to it.
What should be done to try to educate people who certainly
are far, far from aware of what some of us would think is clear
as clear, First Amendment religion? What approach would
you suggest?
I would say that’s a good case where the
bar ought to be front and center, and you ought to be goosing
them to get front and center and say what the judge did in that
case was ordinary, first-year constitutional law, and they ought
to be out there running interference for you, rather than you
doing it yourself.
PROFESSOR FEELEY:

I think people need to see, put themselves
in other people’s shoes. I think that people revere the
Constitution, but when you use the Constitution as your reason for why something shouldn’t be done, it lacks salience. If
you say don’t do that, it’s unconstitutional, people say, “So?”
Now they revere the Constitution because they revere
what’s in it for themselves, so I would say if I was going to run
a campaign on this, I would show what would happen if we
applied this to all religions and how it would be a power battle in terms of religious artifacts in the courtroom, because this
is a tough issue in the long run, and the moral of it is to get
people to step inside someone else’s shoes. . . .
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